This talk will provide a high-level overview of settings where a set of scarce resources (e.g., computer memory or CPU time) needs to be allocated among a group of self-interested and strategic agents. Given a mechanism that decides the allocation (e.g., a memory manager or a CPU scheduler), the agents compete over the available resources and each agent may try to manipulate the mechanism, aiming to optimize his own allocation. The focus of the talk will be on the game-theoretic analysis of the interactions among these agents, as well as on the design of mechanisms that provide the agents with the appropriate incentives, while simultaneously optimizing some fairness or efficiency objective.
Vasilis Gkatzelis is an assistant professor in computer science at Drexel University. He previously held positions as a postdoctoral scholar at the computer science departments of UC Berkeley and Stanford University, and as a research fellow at the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing. He received his PhD from the Courant Institute of New York University, and his research focuses on problems in algorithmic game theory and approximation algorithms.
